
This video is a real-world, two-month review of Apple's Lockdown Mode across iPhone, iPad, and Mac—what it changes, what breaks, and what stays surprisingly normal. The big takeaway: it's marketed as "extreme," but in daily use it often feels pretty manageable, with the biggest pain being iMessage search/media browsing and Safari font rendering. It's mainly for people at higher risk of targeted attacks, but the creator also argues everyday privacy enthusiasts can help by using it too.
The creator opens with a simple promise: people keep asking what Apple's Lockdown Mode is really like, so they used it for months to give an honest answer.
"What is Apple's Lockdown Mode really like to use?"
Apple markets Lockdown Mode as an extreme privacy and security setting, and it's available across Apple's major platforms (iPhone, iPad, Mac). The video's focus is practical: what it does, how extreme it feels, and whether you should turn it on.
"We've been getting a lot of questions… what it does, how extreme it is, and if you should use it."
Before getting into the testing results, they plug their own privacy course, Go Incognito, describing it as beginner-friendly and designed to help people become confident without needing to rely on "experts."
"It's designed for anyone regardless of technical knowledge and experience."
A key philosophy is independence—learning enough to make your own calls:
"The goal is for you to finish feeling independent so you don't have to rely on anyone to make decisions for you—even ourselves."
They mention a free version on YouTube and a paid version with fewer interruptions, better production, quizzes/checklists, and the ability to chat with the creator during the course. They also tease a more updated "version 2" of the course and say premium buyers will be included in future iterations.
"We're working on a version 2… much more updated for the current world."
Next, the creator clarifies logistics and why Lockdown Mode likely exists.
They suggest Apple likely responded to bad press around targeted "state actor" attacks—high-end attacks aimed at specific high-value individuals (not average users), but still damaging to Apple's security reputation.
"Lockdown was likely a response to… targeted state actor attacks against its devices."
They point out an important theme: Apple's prompts explain Lockdown Mode in general terms, but it's hard to know what the restrictions actually mean until you live with them.
"It's really hard to decipher what some of these things actually mean or do… so let's dive into my experience."
The creator says iPhone and iPad behave almost the same under Lockdown Mode. Two areas dominate the experience: iMessage and web browsing.
The first place they immediately felt changes was iMessage.
"If you send a contact a gift then reopen the chat later, it'll just disappear… but it did send properly."
The biggest iMessage impact is losing the easy "shared media" view—normally you can tap a contact and see a gallery of all images in the conversation. With Lockdown Mode, that central media browsing becomes unavailable, making old photos much harder to find.
"You lose the ability to have a central place of seeing all images you two have sent in the chat."
Then comes what they describe as the truly painful one: iMessage search is basically broken (beyond searching contacts/open chats). You can't search for specific words/messages.
"Yes, the search is broken… you can't search for words or messages… which really sucks."
Other iMessage-related changes:
"Link previews are disabled so you have to manually open links."
"With lockdown you're no longer able to… share your focus status."
The second major impact is Safari (and browsing in general).
Lockdown Mode disables certain features that could be exploited, which can reduce speed—noticeable mostly in benchmarks or side-by-side comparisons.
"You should expect a speed decrease… not enough for you to probably notice… but in benchmark environments… a pretty drastic difference."
They also mention possible battery impact, but they suspect it's not significant.
The most obvious browsing limitation is fonts—specifically custom web fonts and related rendering features. This can make some websites look broken or become hard to navigate.
They demonstrate with Cryptee (a privacy-focused note-taking service), emphasizing it's not the site's fault—Lockdown Mode is what causes the ugly/unusable layout.
"Here's Cryptee… without and with Lockdown Mode… this is practically unusable—and it's not Cryptee's fault."
Good news: Safari lets you add per-site exceptions easily—turning Lockdown Mode off for a specific website.
"You can add exceptions very easily… toggling lockdown off for that specific site."
In their view, this is a reasonable tradeoff: if a site looks awful once, you whitelist it and move on.
"Some sites might not work well on first visits… add an exception and boom—you're good to go forever."
Here's where things get more restrictive. On iOS/iPadOS, Apple requires all browsers to use the same underlying engine as Safari (WebKit). So even if you use Brave, Firefox, or Chrome, they're still fundamentally Safari's engine under the hood.
"Whether you use Brave, Firefox, Chrome… they're all actually running the same browser engine as Safari."
That means Lockdown Mode's browsing restrictions also apply to third-party browsers. But unlike Safari, those browsers don't seem to support exceptions—and Safari exceptions don't carry over.
"Third-party browsers don't seem to have the ability to add exceptions… pretty much restricts you to Safari."
So if you rely on a site that needs an exception to work properly, you may be forced to use Safari for it—which is a major limitation for anyone who prefers a different browser.
"This is a very large limitation for me."
After two months, they say only one service truly failed for them: Skiff (correcting subtitle "ski"). A top prompt was broken on the website, and the app was also broken—worse, since apps don't allow exceptions.
They say this prevents people using 2FA (correcting "TFA") from logging in.
"Skiff… [was] entirely broken with Lockdown Mode enabled."
"Their app is actually entirely broken on Lockdown devices since people with 2FA can't even log in."
Aside from Skiff, they say most things still "work," but may look ugly due to the font issue.
"With the exception of Skiff I haven't had any other app or website legitimately break."
They report that most apps behaved normally, even privacy-focused messengers like Signal.
"You can use Signal pretty much the same exact way."
Before moving to macOS, they list additional iOS/iPadOS changes:
They also reassure viewers that if you don't know what profiles are, you probably don't need to worry.
"If you don't know what profiles are, you don't need to worry about this."
On Mac, the creator says the experience is largely familiar. iMessage and Safari restrictions are almost identical to iOS.
"The iMessage and Safari restrictions from iOS are almost identical."
The standout macOS annoyance is repeated accessory prompts when connecting peripherals. If you dock your laptop often, it can get old fast.
"The accessory prompts… are actually really annoying since I use a docking station."
They also describe extra friction when connecting a Lockdown iPhone to a Lockdown Mac: unlock the phone, accept the accessory on the Mac, and sometimes re-enter trust/password prompts—even if you've trusted it before. They aren't sure if it's a bug or intentional.
"I don't know if this is a bug or intentional design… connecting peripherals… [is] the main impact."
Unlike iOS/iPadOS, macOS browsers can use different engines, so third-party browsers aren't automatically constrained the same way. The creator frames this as good or bad depending on what you want: if you want Lockdown protections, you should use Safari.
"Browsers are not stuck to WebKit… third-party browsers should feel completely unaffected."
"For people who want Lockdown's protections, make sure you're using Safari."
They summarize the core impacts:
Crucially, they emphasize that most day-to-day phone functionality still works: messaging, sending media, group chats, calls, etc.
"You can still message people… send them images and videos… make phone calls… use pretty much all the functions on your phone."
Then comes their surprising conclusion:
"I was very surprised… how frankly mellow Lockdown is."
They even believe many friends/family could turn it on and continue using their devices, just with some annoyances.
"I actually think most of my friends and family members could turn it on and get by."
They question Apple's decision-making and threat model (the type of attacker you're defending against). Example: why disable iMessage search, while (they claim) VPNs can still leak web traffic?
"Why is the search feature in iMessage disabled but VPNs on Lockdown Mode still leak your web traffic?"
"What's the threat model here?"
They want Apple to explain why these particular restrictions were chosen.
"I would love Apple to come forward and better answer these questions."
To answer "should I enable it?", they explain what Lockdown Mode actually does in security terms.
Lockdown Mode aims to reduce the attack surface—meaning it shuts off features that could be exploited if someone is specifically targeting you.
They name examples:
Important nuance: these aren't inherently "bad," but they can become entry points for sophisticated attacks.
"Lockdown mainly aims to reduce the attack surface of your devices."
They also point out a privacy downside: enabling Lockdown Mode can make your browser/device more unique, which can make fingerprinting easier (tracking you based on a unique combination of device traits).
"Using Lockdown does make you stand out more… your device is more unique… which can be used to track you around the internet."
They say tools exist that can detect Lockdown Mode, and this could matter for people whose threat model requires strong anonymity.
"This can jeopardize certain threat models… mainly those requiring anonymity."
"If you're not being targeted… you probably don't need Lockdown."
"If you… always need to take the highest degrees of safety… this should definitely be a consideration."
They also encourage privacy/security enthusiasts to consider enabling it anyway, to help reduce how uniquely identifying Lockdown Mode users are (basically, more users = less uniqueness).
"You can partly assist in that battle by using Lockdown Mode yourself to make it a less unique attribute."
They argue that broader usage:
"More people using Lockdown Mode means… Apple… knows that users value those features."
They emphasize how low-risk it is to test: it's just a settings toggle and a reboot. If you hate it, turn it off.
"Turning on and off Lockdown Mode is literally just a toggle… followed by a reboot."
They end with an important clarification: Lockdown Mode does not make you "hack-proof." You can still get malware, and privacy-invasive apps can still spy on you.
"Lockdown Mode doesn't make your device hack proof."
"You can still install the Facebook app and it will spy on you—Lockdown changes none of this."
Instead, it's one extra tool for certain situations in a broader privacy/security journey.
"It's just one extra tool that you can apply… in your journey."
Finally, they point viewers to their iOS and macOS safety guides (made before Lockdown Mode existed, so you should mentally combine the guidance with what you learned here), and they thank supporters.
Lockdown Mode is best understood as a targeted-attack hardening switch: it reduces exploitable features, especially in iMessage and web browsing, with surprisingly little impact on everyday app use. The biggest annoyances are iMessage search/media browsing, Safari font rendering, and on macOS, peripheral accessory prompts. If you're curious, the creator's advice is simple: test it yourself—it's easy to turn on, easy to turn off, and you'll quickly learn whether the tradeoffs fit your life.
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